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Abstract. This paper examines how service providers may resolve the trade-off 
between their personalization efforts and users’ individual privacy concerns. 
Finding that neither an optimized one-size-fits-all strategy, nor a market-driven 
specialization of providers or choices between different usage scenarios can 
solve the problem, we analyze how negotiation techniques can lead to efficient 
contracts and how they can be integrated into current technologies. The analy-
sis includes the identification of relevant and negotiable privacy dimensions for 
different usage domains. Negotiations in multi-channel retailing are examined 
as a detailed example. Based on a formalization of the user’s privacy revelation 
problem, we model the negotiation process as a Bayesian game where the ser-
vice provider faces different types of users. Finally an extension to P3P is pro-
posed that allows a simple expression and implementation of negotiation proc-
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Online users are facing a large and increasing complexity of the web, due to its size and its 
diversity. In online retailing, stores are constantly expanding their assortments in width, depth 
and quality levels, making it impossible for users to examine all possible alternatives. The 
user may be offered effective guidance through automated recommender systems; her appre-
ciation for personalized websites [11], and their economical benefits for service providers 
could be verified empirically [2, 10, 13]. 
Several recommendation strategies have been developed in the past, an overview can be 
found in [14]. All these techniques have in common a need of personal data, either by explicit 
collection or by inferring them. Thus a personalized (or user-adaptive) system intrinsically 
has to deal with privacy issues, especially if personal data is stored and not volatile or only 
saved for the current session. A common way for websites to communicate their privacy prin-
ciples is to post “privacy policies”. 
Our contribution is to depict how negotiation techniques can overcome current drawbacks of 
static privacy policies, and how these negotiations can be implemented using existing tech-
nologies (reviewed in section 2). In section 3 and 4, we examine negotiable privacy dimen-
sions and present the optimization calculi of the user and the service provider respectively, 
based on a formalization of privacy negotiations. Section 5 explains how privacy negotiations 
can be implemented using P3P and illustrates a negotiation scenario in multi-channel retail-
ing. The paper concludes with a summary and outlook in section 6. 
2 Related  Work 
The privacy-personalization trade-off as presented above has led to several approaches both in 
research and in practice, among them are the Platform for Privacy Preferences developed by 
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [19], and the Enterprise Privacy Authorization Lan-
guage (EPAL) developed by IBM [7].  
P3P is a recommendation since 2002 and aims “to inform Web users about the data-collection 
practices of Web sites” [20]. P3P has become widely adopted by service providers but it re-
mains restricted to the “take-it-or-leave-it” principle: The service provider offers a privacy Discussion Papers   526 
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policy; the potential user either can accept it or to reject it as a whole. A negotiation process 
between the involved parties is not intended. Although the first drafts of the P3P specification 
included negotiation mechanisms, these parts had been removed in favour of easy implemen-
tation and early and wide adoption of the protocol. The latest P3P 1.1 specification [20] does 
not mention negotiations either. 
In addition to the P3P specification, the W3C conceived APPEL1.0, A P3P Preference Ex-
change Language 1.0 [18]. APPEL is a language “for describing collections of preferences 
regarding P3P policies between P3P agents”. APPEL is primarily intended as a transmission 
format and a machine-readable expression of a user’s preferences. Given a P3P privacy pol-
icy, it may be evaluated against a user-defined ruleset to determine if her preferences are 
compatible with the service provider’s intentions for data. Though standard behaviours and 
basic matching operations are supported by APPEL, its applications are still limited and the 
capability of expressing negotiation strategies is explicitly excluded from the language’s 
scope. Using APPEL as a negotiation protocol is neither supported by its semantics nor is the 
language designed for this purpose. 
EPAL allows enterprises to express data handling practices in IT systems. The developed 
policies are intended “for exchanging privacy policy in a structured format between applica-
tions or enterprises” [7]. The language focuses on the internal business perspective, and is not 
intended for customers to express their own privacy preferences. Although EPAL is not suited 
for the direct dialogue with the end-user – which is needed for negotiation – privacy guaran-
tees towards customers can sometimes be deduced from the stated internal procedures and 
then be expressed in P3P policies. 
In parallel to the development of privacy-related technologies and research both in online and 
offline IT-based transactions, negotiation has been studied in various disciplines. The bases 
had been set up in game theory, where negotiation is modelled as a bargaining game [8, 16]. 
Recent influences have arisen with the increasing importance of autonomous agents and col-
laborative computing [4]. Frameworks for carrying out negotiations have been developed 
[12]. The rapid development of the Grid and service-based IT-architectures on the technical 
side, and the enduring process outsourcing to third parties on the economic side, combined 
with mobile and ubiquitous computing will make Privacy Negotiation Technologies gain in 
importance in the near future [9, 21]. Discussion Papers   526 
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3 Privacy  Negotiations 
Thompson states that negotiations are an “interpersonal decision-making process necessary 
whenever we cannot achieve our objectives single-handedly” [17]. Especially in the case of 
integrative negotiations, negotiations can unleash the integrative potential that lies in conflict-
ing interests and preferences and turn it into efficient contracts: two major shortcomings of 
current online privacy handling mechanisms can be overcome if privacy negotiation processes 
are implemented during the transaction between the service provider (seller) and the user 
(buyer): 
The first shortcoming is the “take-it-or-leave-it” principle, i.e. the user can only accept or 
refuse the provider’s proposal as a whole. The provider is always the one who moves first, he 
makes the initial offer; the user cannot take the initiative. 
The second shortcoming is the “one-size-fits-all” principle: once the service provider has 
designed its privacy policy, it will be proposed to all interested users – no matter what their 
individual preferences are. There may be users who would have accepted offers with less 
privacy protection and would have agreed to the provider’s proposal even if more personal 
data would have been asked. Thus, the provider fails to tap the users’ full potential. 
3.1  Individualized Privacy Policies 
Adopting a broader view and extending the analysis from a single service provider to the 
whole market, providers specializing on different privacy levels may be an idea. Since the 
amount of service providers (as discrete units) is much smaller than the amount of potential 
privacy preferences, which can be seen as quasi-continuous due to the large number of grada-
tions for all considerable privacy dimensions, a specialization is not trivial. 
Consider n service providers and m à n users having different privacy levels with a known 
distribution. Hence, a given service provider will target more than one privacy level. This 
may be implemented by giving the users the choice between a set of usage scenarios corre-
sponding to different amounts of personal data to be collected. As the differences between 
these usage scenarios have to be clearly communicated and the maintenance of one scenario 
induces costs for the service provider, the set of scenarios will be limited in size to a few 
possibilities. Discussion Papers   526 
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A current example of this strategy is the search site A9.com, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Amazon.com, Inc. A9.com offers a highly personalized version of its services, which is the 
standard setting. Users more concerned about their privacy can switch to an alternative ser-
vice where the data collection and use is limited to a minimum and no personalization is im-
plemented. 
The notable difference between the offered privacy levels is part of the service provider’s user 
discrimination strategy and aims at a successful self-selection of the potential users. Thence, 
even under market-driven specialization and alternative usage scenarios, the user still faces 
fixed policies and the main problem persists. 
3.2 Negotiable  Privacy  Dimensions 
As we have seen in the previous section, neither a market-driven segmentation between ser-
vices providers offering different privacy levels, nor a mechanism based on choices between 
different usage scenarios turns out to be adequate solutions, so that negotiation is the remain-
ing approach. Apparently, as it is not feasible to negotiate the entire privacy policy, one im-
portant aspect is to identify relevant and negotiable privacy dimensions. We define a privacy 
dimension as one facet of the multi-dimensional concept ‘user privacy’. For each dimension, 
different discrete revelation levels exist, monotonously associated with the user’s willingness 
to reveal the data. Privacy dimensions can be identified at different degrees of granularity. 
Based on the semantics of P3P, a priori all non-optional parts of a P3P privacy STATEMENT are 
possible negotiable privacy dimensions: The RECIPIENT of the data, the PURPOSE for which the 
data will be used, the RETENTION time and what kind of DATA will be collected. Other elements 
of a privacy statement, such as the CONSEQUENCE or possible EXTENSIONs may not be included in 
the negotiation process: the consequence is only a short summary or a human-readable expla-
nation of the data practices described in the (rest of the) statement. The contents of this ele-
ment are intended to be shown to a human user. As for possible extensions, the semantics of 
issuer-defined additions may be ambiguous and one cannot presume that issuer-defined ex-
tensions will be understood by all user agents. As shown by empirical studies, the four ge-
neric dimensions (recipient, purpose, retention, and data) reflect privacy aspects users are 
concerned about. Moreover, they are in accordance with European privacy legislation [5, 6]. Discussion Papers   526 
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It is obvious, that the importance of each of the four dimensions as perceived by the users as 
well as their respective willingness to provide information, depends on the thematic domain 
of the service. Some recent work proposed to negotiate the recipient of the data in different 
application scenarios, among them are medical help [21], distance education [22], and online 
retailing [4]. We will focus on negotiating the amount of data to be revealed (see section 3.4). 
3.3  Privacy vs. Personalization – User’s Individual Utility Calculus 
In order to model the user’s individual trade-off between personalization and privacy, we 
present it as a utility maximization problem, taking into account different overall sensitivity 
levels towards privacy and different importance one may assign to a specific privacy dimen-
sion. The formalization allows solving the negotiation game presented in section 4, giving the 
service provider the opportunity to choose its optimal strategy.  
We denote the user’s utility by U, using the following notations: 
D
n is a n-dimensional privacy space and 
di ∈ D are its privacy dimensions 
ai is the user’s data revelation level on dimension di 
ai
T is a threshold indicating the minimum required data the user must reveal 
αi is a weighting of dimension di 
γ indicates the user’s global privacy sensitivity 
R is the discount provided by the service provider 
P are other non-monetary personalization benefits 
B is the base utility by the execution of the contract 
Using this notation, the user’s utility can be expressed by: 




i + + + ⋅ − = ∏
=
..., , ..., , . 1 1
1
α γ . 
(1)
In case that the user is not willing to provide sufficient data for the contract to be executed, 
the base utility B and the discount R will be zero (2). The user gets the personalization bene-
fits P even if the involved parties do not conclude on a contract. In case P is less than the 
negative utility the user gets from providing the necessary data, the user will prefer unperson-
alized usage of the services (3). Discussion Papers   526 
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As the ability to identify a user individually (identity inference, also known as triangulation) 
does not increase linearly when more data is provided, we use a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
instead of an additive composition for the user’s disutility of data revelation. Two other im-
portant characteristics of this utility expression in the context of privacy awareness are dis-
cussed at the end of this section. 
The thresholds ai
T are set by the service provider and are usually openly communicated. In 
implementations, hints like ‘required field’, ‘required information’ or form fields marked by 
an asterisk are common practice. The necessity can be deduced from the nature of the transac-
tion: It is obvious that an online bookstore cannot achieve postal delivery if the user refuses to 
provide her shipping address. It is to note that in this model, the kind of privacy dimensions is 
not fixed: The purpose as well as the recipient can be privacy dimensions. In the case of ship-
ping, the threshold for the recipient dimension may be the company itself (no third-party 
logistics company used) and the minimum purpose the user has to agree upon may be postal 
delivery. 
The weightings αi for each of the privacy dimensions as well as the global privacy sensitivity 
γ are private information of the user and constitute her type. The same holds for the valuation 
of the non-monetary personalization benefits P and the base utility B, but these two compo-
nents can be neglected in the further analysis: First, users tend to only valuate additional per-
sonalization benefits, known solutions will shortly be seen as a standard service and thus there 
will be no special appreciation. Nevertheless, some personalization benefits may remain. In 
case of classical implementations such as active guidance, purchase suggestions based on 
purchase or service usage history, product highlighting or implicit search criteria, the person-
alization improves the perceived service quality. Through the active support, the user can save 
search time and simultaneously the matching quality between her preferences and the store’s 
offers increases: These savings can be seen as monetary benefits and thus subsumed under the 
variable R. This is especially appropriate, as increased matching quality only becomes effec-
tive in case the product is purchased (and R is zero in case of no contract). The base utility Discussion Papers   526 
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can be neglected as it does not depend on the data revelation levels. Hence, the user’s type is 
determined by αi and γ. 
As mentioned above, the multiplicative structure of the Cobb-Douglas utility function allows 
a good expression of inference threats. In addition, there are two other interesting characteris-
tics in the context of profile data, related to each other. First, the different privacy dimensions 
are not perfectly substitutable (e.g. the user’s telephone number and her e-mail address consti-
tute two possible ways to contact the user but they are not completely interchangeable). Sec-
ond, different to an additive composition, the substitution rate between two privacy dimen-
sions (which yields here to - αiai/αjaj) is not constant or independent from the current level of 
revealed data: it decreases with the amount of data already provided. 
The influences of the different parts on the user’s utility function are described by the partial 
derivatives and their interpretations shown below: 
•  ∑U / ∑ai b 0: Any privacy infringement reduces the user’s utility except in the case where 
she does not care. 
•  ∑U / ∑R > 0: The user appreciates discounts. 
•  ∑R / ∑ai r 0: But the service provider is only willing to grant discounts in case he gets 
some personal information in return. The case ∑R / ∑ai = 0 is applicable for a privacy di-
mension irrelevant in the current transaction scenario or (more restricted) for which the 
service provider does not honour revelation.  
•  ∑P / ∑ai r 0: The more data the service provider can access, the better the personalization 
will be. 
•  ∑B / ∑ai = 0: The contracts base utility is independent of the user’s revelation level. 
3.4  Negotiating the ‘data’-Dimension 
While the recipient may be the relevant negotiation dimension for distance education or 
health services, we propose the extent and amount of shared data as negotiation dimension for 
online retailing. First, the willingness of customers to provide personal information is mainly 
determined by the service provider’s reputation, who is the (nonnegotiable) initial recipient of 
the data. Second, disclosure practices are often determined business processes (e.g. out-
sourced billing services or delivery by third-party companies). Third, the relevance of the Discussion Papers   526 
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retention time is rated considerably less important [1]. Finally, all data carries with it a more 
or less pronounced intrinsic purpose that cannot be subject to a negotiation (e.g. phone num-
bers are used for personal contact and telemarketing). Hence, negotiating the kind of data 
seems appropriate in the case of online retailing. 
Generally spoken, for a type of data to become part of the negotiation process, it must at least 
meet the following criteria: 
•  the user must be able to provide the data 
•  the data must not be off-topic; the user should see at least a slight reason for the necessity 
of providing it  
•  it must not be indispensable for the execution of the contract, either by its nature or by the 
level of detail (i.e. no negotiations for ai < ai
T) 
•  the service provider must gain the user’s favour for collecting the data, i.e. if the data can 
be smoothly collected without the user’s consent, there is no need for negotiating (for ex-
ample the request time can be collected automatically) 
The empirical findings of [1] allow establishing a cardinal ordering of types of data according 
to the willingness of user’s to provide the information. Ackermann et al. found significant 
differences in comfort level across the various types of information, implying weighting fac-
tors αi in the user’s utility function constituting one aspect of the user’s type. The other as-
pect, the global privacy sensitivity expressed by γ, will be examined in the following section. 
4  The Service Provider’s Perspective 
4.1  Facing Different Types of Users 
The service provider is confronted with different types of customers that have various global 
privacy sensitivity levels, and may rate the importance of one kind of data differently. Effi-
cient customer value extraction is based on a combination of discrimination and negotiation 
techniques. Discrimination relies on the identification of different groups of customers having 
the same (or a comparable) type. [1] identified three types: the ‘privacy fundamentalists’, the 
‘pragmatics’, and the ‘marginally concerned’ users. [15] distinguishes the pragmatic majority 
into ‘profiling averse’ and ‘identity concerned’ users, hence establishing four user clusters. Discussion Papers   526 
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Table 1 summarizes the four types whose distribution is assumed to be common knowledge; 
the characteristics are deduced from [1] and [15]. 
Table 4-1 
User typology 
User type  Characteristics, Important factors 
θPF 
(fundamentalists) 
γ near 1 
extremely concerned about any use of their data 
θPA 
(profile averse) 
γ around 0.5 
sensitive about equipment, salary, hobbies, health or age 
θIC 
(identity concerned) 
γ around 0.5 
sensitive about addresses, phone or credit card numbers 
θMC 
(marginally concerned) 
γ near 0 
generally willing to provide data 
 
4.2  Modelling the Negotiation Process 
Various methods for modelling negotiation processes exist, some more influenced by com-
puter science (e.g. using finite state machines), others more influenced by microeconomics. 
We will adopt a game-theoretic approach, examining two possible negotiation scenarios: a 
sequential game as framework and a simultaneous game that may be played on every step. [3] 
has examined negotiation protocols in different contexts: customer anonymity (or not), com-
plete knowledge of the service provider’s strategy (or not) and no transaction costs for both 
parties (or not). 
Assuming that the service provider can reliably identify privacy fundamentalists for example 
by means of web usage mining technologies, he will propose a take-it-or-leave-it offer to 
fundamentalists as in most cases, the valuation of hiding personal data will be higher than the 
discounts the service provider can offer; the inequality (3) becomes binding. This results in a 
subgame that can be solved by standard procedures. In contrast, the three other types are in-
distinguishable for the service provider. Cf. figure 1 where the nodes for the types θPA, θIC and 
θMC are in the same information set whereas the node for type θPF is apart. Discussion Papers   526 
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Figure 4-1 
The service provider negotiates with three types he cannot distinguish 
 
[µPF]  [µPA]  [µIC]  [µMC] 
negotiation 
take leave
offer no offer 
service provider
customer
θPF θPA  θMC  θIC 
 
The service provider’s strategy is a function that associates discounts to data revelation level 
vectors (D
n → ran(R)). Determining the service provider’s best strategy results in solving the 
following optimization problem: For users being drawn from a known distribution (with the 
probabilities as depicted in figure 1), maximize the total profit. The total profit is the revenue 
generated by the whole population minus the granted discounts, minus the costs for imple-
menting the personalization, and minus other costs. Latter encompass in particular customers 
that are lost during the negotiation process by cancelling (e.g. due to psychological reasons or 
just because they feel overstrained). This maximization is subject to constraint of the users’ 
participation constraint (U(.) - B > 0) and the constraints (2) and (3). We deliberately refrain 
from a detailed solution, as rigorously integrating the service provider’s cost structure would 
go beyond the scope of this paper. 
The framework for the negotiation process is a dynamic game where the service provider has 
high bargaining power: He opens the negotiation with a basic offer, consisting of a small 
discount and a few personal data (the threshold) to be asked. This constitutes the fallback 
offer in case the user does not want to enter negotiation. In case the user accepts, she will be 
presented another offer with a higher discount and more data to be asked. On every step, the 
user may cancel (i.e. no contract or the fallback solution are implemented), continue (i.e. 
reveal more data or switch to another privacy dimension) to the next step or confirm (i.e. the 
reached agreement will be implemented). 
This wizard-like structure is strategically equivalent to a set of offers as (data, discount)-
tuples from which the user can choose one. However, a sequential implementation allows 
better guidance, better communication of the benefits in providing the data and instantaneous 
adaptation of the strategy. Note that for a given offer, the requested data are always a subset 
of the requested data of the previous offer, even if the customer only enters the additional Discussion Papers   526 
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information (monotonously increasing revelation level for a given dimension). The service 
provider can also implement more alternatives for one step, so that the user can choose which 
data she will provide (for example the service provider can ask either for the home address or 
the office address). This is particular useful for addressing different weightings of privacy 
dimensions that are equivalent for the service provider. Implementations may offer the multi-
ple privacy dimensions sequentially. A switch to another dimension is performed in case the 
user refuses to provide further data or the service provider is not interested in a higher detail 
level for the current dimension. A current implementation is described in section 5.2. 
In this basic case, the service provider grants a fixed discount on every single step, which is 
cumulated along the process. A more sophisticated procedure could also include the service 
provider’s concessions into the negotiation process, e.g. by a simultaneous game on every 
stage: the user indicates the minimum discount she wants to get for revealing the data and the 
service provider indicates the maximum discount he wants to grant. Problems will arise as the 
service provider’s maximal willingness can be overt due to the unlimited number of times one 
or several anonymous users can play this simultaneous game. 
5 Implementation 
5.1  Integrating Privacy Negotiations into P3P 
The negotiation process as described in the previous section can be implemented using the 
extension mechanism of P3P, which can be used both in a policy reference file and in a single 
privacy policy. The extensions in the privacy policies will not be optional, but in order to 
ensure backward compatibility, these extended policies will only be referenced in an exten-
sion of the policy reference file. Hence, only user agents capable of interpreting the negotia-
tion extension will fetch extended policies. 
In a P3P policy, two extensions can be added: a NEGOTIATION-GROUP-DEF in the POLICY ele-
ment, and a NEGOTIATION-GROUP in the STATEMENT element. The mechanism is comparable to 
the tandem of STATEMENT-GROUP-DEF and STATEMENT-GROUP in P3P 1.1 [20]. A NEGOTIATION-
GROUP-DEF element defines an abstract pool of alternative usage scenarios. One or several 
statements (identified by the attribute id) code a possible usage scenario; the pool member-Discussion Papers   526 
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ship is expressed by the NEGOTIATION-GROUP extension in the statement (attribute groupid), 
which describes relevant parameters of the given scenario, such as the benefits for the user. 
This mechanism allows to establish a n:m-relation between statements and negotiation 
groups. The fallback contract can be indicated via the standard-attribute of the NEGOTIATION-
GROUP-DEF element. The following example illustrates the usage: users of a bookstore can 
choose between e-books sent by email and hard copy books, shipped by postal delivery: 
Example of an extended P3P policy, including the proposed elements NEGOTIATION-GROUP-DEF 





  <NEGOTIATION-GROUP-DEF id="delivery" standard="delivery_hardcopy" 




  <EXTENSION optional="no"> 
    <NEGOTIATION-GROUP groupid="delivery" id="delivery_ebook" 
      name="delivery as e-book" benefits="10% discount"/> 
  </EXTENSION> 
  ... 
  <DATA-GROUP> 
    <DATA ref="#user.home-info.online.email"/> 
  </DATA-GROUP> 
</STATEMENT>... 
<STATEMENT> 
  <EXTENSION optional="no"> 
    <NEGOTIATION-GROUP groupid="delivery" id="delivery_hardcopy" 
      name="delivery as hard copy" benefits="robust hard-cover" /> 
  </EXTENSION> 
  ... Discussion Papers   526 
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  <DATA-GROUP> 
    <DATA ref="#user.name"/> 
    <DATA ref="#user.home-info.postal"/> 




Note that the benefits given in human-readable format need to be displayed concisely by the 
user agent. The example above shows that the human-readable privacy policy and other in-
formation resources on the site must work hand in hand with the P3P policy. The exhaustive 
machine-readable coding of the benefits is a remaining challenge – especially for multi-
dimensional phenomena other than just a reduced purchase price. 
5.2 Example:  Negotiations in Multi-Channel Retailing 
In addition to the introductory example of the previous section, we want to outline a possible 
privacy negotiation for a multi-channel retailer. The scenario is as follows: Besides using the 
service provider’s e-shop, customers can find the nearest store by entering their ZIP code into 
the store locator. A check of majority is done before these website services can be used. 
Two privacy dimensions can be identified: the user’s age (d1), with the revelation levels: 
{year (Y), year and month (YM), year and month and day (YMD)}, and the user’s address 
(d2), with the revelation levels: {city (C), city and ZIP code (CZ), city and ZIP code and street 
(CZS)}. The revelation thresholds are a1
T = year (for the majority check) and a2
T = city and 
ZIP code (for the store locator). Possible negotiation outcomes are depicted in the left part of 
figure 2. Using the user’s utility function as defined in equation (1), we can draw iso-utility 
curves: the user’s disutility increases when moving to the upper right corner, as the revelation 




Possible negotiation outcomes. Contracts whose data revelation levels are below the 
thresholds cannot be reached (marked by unfilled dots) (left). User’s iso-utility curves 
corresponding to different revelation levels (right) 
 
d1 / age 








T: city + ZIP 





Based on these two figures, the service provider develops its strategy: he chooses the dis-
counts he will grant to the customer for each of the six possible contracts, “labelling” them 
with the R(.) function (that maps from D
n to discounts). Hence, he can code the negotiation 
space by six statements in an extended P3P policy. 
The customer’s user agent fetches this policy and serves as a negotiation support system, 
displaying possible alternatives (a human-readable communication of the data handling prac-
tices as coded in the statements along with negotiation benefits) from which the user can 
choose one. We have integrated this negotiation support into the Mozilla browser, thence 
extending its P3P support: a site’s privacy policy can be accessed via the “Policy”, “Sum-
mary” and “Options” buttons in the “Page Info” dialog, directly available from the status bar. 
Extending the chrome components, we have added a “Negotiate” button: a modal dialog is 
opened, summarizing the negotiable privacy dimensions (di) and the possible realizations (ai) 
with drop-down menus. The implementation relies on XUL and JavaScript, uses the Mozilla 
APIs and integrates seamlessly into the user agent. As the proposed extension to P3P is not 
restricted to a specific privacy dimensions, neither is the implementation. Any privacy dimen-
sion can be negotiated as long it can be expressed using the P3P data scheme. Discussion Papers   526 
6 Conclusion and Further Work 
  15
6  Conclusion and Further Work 
This paper has presented the necessity of negotiation about privacy principles in a relationship 
between service provider and customer. Negotiating allows a better matching between the 
seller’s needs and the buyer’s disclosure restraint and helps to reduce the trade-off between 
personalization and privacy. Modelling the user’s individual utility maximization can take 
into account the multi-dimensionality of privacy; the service provider may wish to reduce the 
negotiation space in a way that suits the given business scenario. The incremental revelation 
of data by the user can be strategically reduced to a choice from a set of alternatives. Using 
the extension mechanism of P3P, there is no limitation in coding these alternatives even for 
complex cases involving diverse privacy dimensions: We proposed two new elements that 
follow the structure of the current P3P 1.1 grouping mechanisms and allow software-
supported negotiations in E-Commerce. Software support of the extension was added to the 
Mozilla browser, integrating privacy negotiations seamlessly into the user agent. 
Future work will focus on the practical implementation of privacy negotiation techniques on 
large scale public websites. We are currently investigating which user interface design best 
fulfils the usability requirements and how negotiable privacy dimensions are best visualized. 
Moreover, a taxonomy should be developed to allow a machine-readable coding of the user’s 
benefits for a negotiation alternative. A remaining question is whether users feel more con-
cerned about their privacy when an explicit negotiation process is started. This increasing 
sensitivity could make take-it-or-leave-it offers more favourable for the service provider. 
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